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This paper proves the following result: every path-connected domain of prefer-
ences that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, tops-only random social choice
function satisfying a compromise property is single-peaked. Conversely, every
single-peaked domain admits a random social choice function satisfying these
properties. Single-peakedness is defined with respect to arbitrary trees. The paper
provides a justification of the salience of single-peaked preferences and evidence
in favor of the Gul conjecture (Barberà 2010).




Single-peaked preferences are the cornerstone of several models in political economy
and social choice theory. They were proposed initially by Black (1948) and Inada (1964),
and can be informally described as follows. The set of alternatives is endowed with a
structure that enables one to say for some triples of alternatives, say a, b, and c, that b
is “closer” to a than c. On a preference order that is single-peaked, if an alternative b is
closer to the maximal element in the preference than another alternative c, it must be
the case that b is ranked above c in the preference. A domain of preferences is single-
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the domain are single-peaked with respect to that structure. Single-peaked preferences
arise naturally in various settings. However, their main attraction is that they allow suc-
cessful preference aggregation both in the Arrovian and the strategic sense (Moulin 1980,
Barberà 2010), for instance, by the median voter aggregator/social choice function. Our
goal in this paper is to provide a converse result with the following flavor: any “rich”
preference domain that admits a suitably “well behaved” solution to the strategic voting
problem must be a single-peaked domain.1
Our model consists of a finite number of voters and alternatives.2 We consider ran-
dom social choice functions (RSCFs) defined on a suitably rich but arbitrary domain of
preference orders. A RSCF associates a probability distribution over alternatives with ev-
ery profile of voters’ preference orders in the domain. Following Gibbard (1977), a RSCF
is strategy-proof if truth-telling by a voter results in a probability distribution that first-
order stochastically dominates the probability distribution that arises from any misrep-
resentation by the voter. Moreover, this holds for every possible profile of other voters
so that truth-telling is a (weakly) dominant strategy in the revelation game. In addition
to strategy-proofness, we impose three other requirements on RSCFs under considera-
tion. Two of these, unanimity and tops-onlyness, are standard in the literature on vot-
ing. The third axiom is the compromise property. Consider a preference profile where
the set of voters is split into two equal groups3 and the following conditions are satis-
fied: (i) all voters within a group have identical preferences; (ii) the peaks of the prefer-
ences of the two groups are different; (iii) there is an alternative that is second-ranked
according to the preferences of both groups. This commonly second-ranked alternative
can be regarded as a compromise alternative and the axiom requires that this alterna-
tive receives strictly positive probability in the profile. According to our main result, any
rich domain that admits a strategy-proof, tops-only RSCF satisfying unanimity and the
compromise property must be single-peaked. Conversely, any single-peaked domain
admits a strategy-proof, tops-only RSCF satisfying ex post efficiency (a stronger version
of unanimity) and the compromise property.
The single-peaked domain characterized by our result is more general than the usual
one (for example, in Moulin 1980). These preferences were introduced in Demange
(1982) and Danilov (1994), and are defined on arbitrary trees.
It is natural to allow for randomization whenever there are conflicts of interest
among agents. Randomization also facilitates truth-telling because the evaluation of
lotteries using the expected utility hypothesis imposes preference restrictions. Recently
Chatterji et al. (2014) have shown that randomization can significantly enlarge the class
of strategy-proof and unanimous rules in dictatorial domains. Results characterizing
the class of strategy-proof and unanimous RSCFs for single-peaked domains (on the
line) have been obtained in Ehlers et al. (2002), Peters et al. (2014), and Pycia and Ünver
(2015).
1Claims of this nature have been referred to as the Gul conjecture in Barberà (2010) and attributed to
Faruk Gul. The precise formulation of the conjecture can take several forms. Our result can be regarded as
further evidence in favor of the conjecture.
2The number of alternatives is assumed to be at least three.
3If there is an odd number of voters, the two groups are “almost” equal.
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Another consequence of considering RSCFs is that the anonymity requirement
(anonymity implies that the names of voters do not matter and reshuffling preferences
across voters does not affect the social outcome) imposed on deterministic social choice
functions (DSCFs) to rule out dictatorship must be replaced, because it is always possi-
ble to design a strategy-proof RSCF that satisfies anonymity. To see this, consider an ar-
bitrary domain and the RSCF that picks the top-ranked alternative of voter i with proba-
bility 1/N at each profile (N is the number of voters).4 This RSCF is a particular instance
of a random dictatorship (Gibbard 1977) and is strategy-proof, anonymous, ex post ef-
ficient, and tops-only. However, it suffers from a well recognized defect: it does not
permit society to put positive probability on an alternative unless it is top-ranked for
some voter, even though the alternative may be highly ranked (say second-ranked) for
all voters. The present paper introduces the compromise axiom, which is a natural way
to ensure that social decisions give strictly positive probability to a compromise alterna-
tive whenever it exists. In conjunction with the other assumptions on the RSCF, we find
that it implies that the domain must be single-peaked.
A paper related to ours is Chatterji et al. (2013). That paper investigated preference
domains that admit well behaved and strategy-proof DSCFs. In particular, it showed
that every rich domain that admits a strategy-proof, unanimous, anonymous, and tops-
only DSCF with an even number of voters is semi-single-peaked.5 These preferences
are also defined on trees but are significantly less restrictive than single-peaked prefer-
ences. Our paper demonstrates that two important objectives can be met by consider-
ing RSCFs rather than DSCFs. The first is that a characterization of single-peaked rather
than semi-single-peaked preferences can be obtained naturally. The second is that the
awkward assumption regarding the even number of voters in Chatterji et al. (2013) can
be removed.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 and various subsections present the
model, definitions, and axioms. Section 3 contains the characterization result for single-
peaked domains and demonstrates the indispensability of each of our axioms and the
richness condition. Section 4 concludes. Appendices A and B contain some additional
discussion and an omitted proof.
2. Model and notation
Let A = {a1 a2     am} be a finite set of alternatives with m ≥ 3. Let (A) denote the
lottery space induced by A. An element of (A) is a lottery or probability distribution
over the elements of A. For every aj ∈ A, let ej ∈ (A) denote the degenerate lottery
where alternative aj gets probability 1.
Let I = {1    N} be a finite set of voters with |I| = N ≥ 2. Each voter i has a (strict
preference) order Pi over A that is antisymmetric, complete and transitive, i.e., a linear
4This description is valid for profiles where the peaks of voters are distinct. A complete description can
be found in the definition of a random dictatorship at the end of Section 2.1.
5The notion of richness is exactly the same as that in our paper.
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order. For any ajak ∈ A, ajPiak is interpreted as “aj is strictly preferred to ak accord-
ing to Pi.” Let P denote the set containing all linear orders over A. The set of all ad-
missible orders is a set D ⊆ P, referred to as the preference domain. A preference profile
P ≡ (P1P2    PN) ∈DN is an N-tuple of orders.
For any Pi ∈D, rk(Pi) denotes the kth ranked alternative in Pi, k= 1    m. For any
P ∈DN , r1(P)=⋃i∈I{r1(Pi)} denotes the set of voters’ peaks or first-ranked alternatives.
2.1 Random social choice functions and their properties
A random social choice function (RSCF) is a map ϕ :DN → (A). At every profile P ∈DN ,
ϕ(P) is the “socially desirable” lottery. For any aj ∈A, ϕj(P) is the probability with which
aj will be chosen in the lottery ϕ(P). Thus, ϕj(P)≥ 0 and ∑mj=1ϕj(P)= 1.
A deterministic social choice function (DSCF) is a RSCF ϕ : DN → (A) where the
outcome at every preference profile is a degenerate probability distribution, i.e., ϕ(P)=
ej for some aj ∈A at profile P .
A RSCF satisfies unanimity if it assigns probability 1 to any alternative that is ranked
first by all voters, i.e., RSCF ϕ : DN → (A) satisfies unanimity if [r1(Pi) = aj for all
i ∈ I] ⇒ [ϕ(P)= ej] for all aj ∈A and P ∈DN .
An axiom stronger than unanimity is ex post efficiency. It requires all Pareto-
dominated outcomes to never be chosen. Formally, the RSCF ϕ : DN → (A) is ex post
efficient if for all ajak ∈A and P ∈DN , [aj Pi ak for all i ∈ I] ⇒ [ϕk(P)= 0].
Voters’ preferences are assumed to be private information. It is important there-
fore for voters to have appropriate incentives to reveal their private information truth-
fully. A RSCF is strategy-proof if truth-telling is a (weakly) dominant strategy for ev-
ery voter, i.e., the truth-telling lottery first-order stochastically dominates the lotteries
arising from misrepresentation. Formally, the RSCF ϕ : DN → (A) is strategy-proof if∑t
k=1ϕrk(Pi)(PiP−i) ≥
∑t
k=1ϕrk(Pi)(P ′i P−i), t = 1    m, holds for all i ∈ I; PiP ′i ∈ D,
and P−i ∈ DN−1. This notion of strategy-proofness was first formulated in Gibbard
(1977). It is equivalent to requiring a voter’s expected utility from truth-telling to be no
less than her expected utility from misrepresentation of any cardinal representation of
her true preferences. We omit these details, which may be found in Gibbard (1977).
A prominent class of RSCFs is the class of tops-only RSCFs. The value of these RSCFs
at any profile depends only on voters’ peaks at that profile. The RSCF ϕ : DN → (A)
satisfies the tops-only property if [r1(Pi) = r1(P ′i) for all i ∈ I] ⇒ [ϕ(P) = ϕ(P ′)] for all
PP ′ ∈ DN . Tops-only RSCFs have obvious informational and computational advan-
tages; for this reason, they (more accurately, DSCFs) have received a great deal of at-
tention in the literature (see Weymark 2008 and Chatterji and Sen 2011).
The notions of unanimity, ex post efficiency, strategy-proofness, and tops-onlyness
are standard axioms in the literature on mechanism design in voting environments. Be-
low, we first introduce a mechanism that satisfies all axioms mentioned above.
Consider the RSCF known as random dictatorship. Each voter is assigned a nonneg-
ative weight, with the sum of weights across voters being 1. At any profile, the probability
with which an arbitrary alternative aj is chosen is the sum of the probability weights of
voters for whom aj is the first-ranked alternative. Random dictatorships satisfy all the
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properties discussed above: they are ex post efficient, tops-only, and strategy-proof. If
the weights are 1/N , they also satisfy the property of anonymity, i.e., they do not de-
pend on the “names” of voters.6 Yet they suffer from an important and well known in-
firmity: they do not admit compromise. Imagine a two-voter world with several alterna-
tives (say, a thousand). Consider a profile where voter 1’s first-ranked and thousandth-
ranked alternatives are aj and ak, respectively. Alternatively, voter 2’s first-ranked and
thousandth-ranked alternative are ak and aj , respectively. Suppose, in addition, that
there is an alternative say ar that is highly ranked by both voters, for instance, ranked
second by both. A reasonable RSCF should put at least some probability weight on ar ,
but no random dictatorship would.
2.2 The compromise property
We introduce a new axiom so as to deal with the difficulties associated with random dic-
tatorships outlined above. The axiom requires some compromise alternatives in certain
profiles to be selected by the RSCF with strictly positive probability.
Let PiPj ∈ D be such that r1(Pi) 	= r1(Pj). Let C(PiPj) = {ar ∈ A | ar = r2(Pi) =
r2(Pj)}. Note that C(PiPj) is either empty or contains a singleton.
Let Iˆ ⊂ I be a nonempty strict subset of voters. For any PiPj ∈ D, let
(Pi    Pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Iˆ
 Pj    Pj︸ ︷︷ ︸
I\Iˆ
) denote the profile where all voters in Iˆ have the order Pi while
those not in Iˆ have Pj .
Definition 1. A RSCF ϕ :DN → (A) satisfies the compromise property if there exists
Iˆ ⊆ I with |Iˆ| =N/2 if N is even and |Iˆ| = (N + 1)/2 if N is odd, such that for all PiPj ∈D
with r1(Pi) 	= r1(Pj) and C(PiPj)≡ {ar}, we have ϕr(Pi    Pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Iˆ
 Pj    Pj︸ ︷︷ ︸
I\Iˆ
) > 0.
The axiom requires the existence of a subset of voters Iˆ that is approximately half
the size of the set of voters. Pick an arbitrary profile where all voters in Iˆ have identical
preferences as do voters in the complement set I \ Iˆ. Suppose the common preferences
in Iˆ and I \ Iˆ have distinct peaks but have a common second-ranked alternative ar . Ac-
cording to the axiom, the RSCF must give ar strictly positive probability at the profile.
We believe that the axiom is both weak and natural. It is weak because it applies to
a very narrow class of profiles. It is natural because in the profile where it applies, the
alternative to which strictly positive probability is assigned according to the axiom, is an
obvious compromise between the two groups of voters.
We make two remarks about the set Iˆ in Definition 1. The first is that Definition 1
merely requires the existence of one such set of voters. A stronger but equally plau-
sible axiom would require the property to hold for all subsets Iˆ such that |Iˆ| = N/2
if N is even and |Iˆ| = (N + 1)/2 if N is odd. We make the weaker assumption be-
cause the stronger one is not required for our result. Note however that once Iˆ is fixed,
6A RSCF ϕ : DN → (A) is anonymous if for every permutation σ : I → I and P ∈ DN , ϕ(P1    PN) =
ϕ(Pσ(1)    Pσ(N)).
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the strictly positive probability requirement on the compromise applies to all profiles
(Pi    Pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Iˆ
 Pj    Pj︸ ︷︷ ︸
I\Iˆ
).
The second remark is to point out that the choice of the cardinality of Iˆ in Defini-
tion 1 is arbitrary. As footnote 11 points out, any choice of the cardinality of Iˆ works for
our proof, provided 0 < |Iˆ| < N . We could have assumed, for instance, that |Iˆ| = 2 or
|Iˆ| = N − 1. We could even have left |Iˆ| unspecified. We have however chosen |Iˆ| to be
approximately half of N because we feel that it is the compelling case for the axiom to
hold.
2.3 Domains
Our goal in this paper is to characterize preference domains that admit RSCFs satisfy-
ing the properties described in the previous subsection. However, we need to restrict
attention to domains that satisfy a regularity condition that we call path-connectedness.
The path-connectedness condition was introduced in Chatterji et al. (2013).7 Fix a
domain D. A pair of distinct alternatives ajak ∈A satisfies the free pair at the top (FPT)
property if there exist PiP ′i ∈D such that (i) r1(Pi)= r2(P ′i)= aj , (ii) r2(Pi)= r1(P ′i)= ak,
and (iii) rt(Pi) = rt(P ′i), t = 3    m. In other words, two alternatives satisfy the FPT
property if there exists a pair of admissible orders where the alternatives are at the top
of both orders and are locally switched, i.e., all alternatives other than the specified pair
are ranked in the same way in both orders. Let FPT(D) denote the set of alternative
pairs that satisfy the FPT property. The domain D is path-connected if for every pair
of alternatives ajak ∈ A, there exists a sequence {xt}Tt=1 ⊆ A, T ≥ 2, such that x1 = aj ,
xT = ak and (xtxt+1) ∈ FPT(D), t = 1    T − 1.
The path-connectedness assumption imposes structure on the domain. It allows
the construction of paths between admissible orders by switching preferences at the top
of the orders. Very similar conditions have been identified in Carroll (2012) and Sato
(2013) as being critical for the purpose of identifying domains where local incentive-
compatibility ensures strategy-proofness.8
Chatterji et al. (2013) provide an extensive discussion of well known domains that
satisfy the path-connectedness assumption. The complete domain and the single-
peaked domain are path-connected. Maximal single-crossing domains (Saporiti 2009)
are path-connected provided that every alternative is first-ranked in some order in the
domain. A generalized single-peaked domain (Nehring and Puppe 2007) may or may not
be path-connected. Alternatively, the separable domain (Barberà et al. 1991, Le Breton
and Sen 1999) and the multidimensional single-peaked domain (Barberà et al. 1993) are
not path-connected. For details the reader is referred to Examples 1, 2, and 3 in Chatterji
et al. (2013).
7Slightly different names were used in Chatterji et al. (2013) for the free pair at the top property and
path-connectedness. We believe that the new names are more apposite.
8Assume that every alternative is first-ranked in some preference. Then domains of ordinal preferences
studied in both Carroll (2012) and Sato (2013) are path-connected.
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9
a1 a1 a2 a2 a2 a3 a3 a4 a4
a2 a2 a1 a4 a3 a2 a2 a2 a2
a4 a3 a4 a3 a4 a4 a1 a3 a1
a3 a4 a3 a1 a1 a1 a4 a1 a3
Table 1. Domain D¯.
A domain of central importance in collective choice theory is the single-peaked do-
main. It was originally introduced in Black (1948) and Inada (1964). Here we consider a
generalization due to Demange (1982) and Danilov (1994).
An undirected graph G = 〈V E〉 is a set of vertices V and a set of edges E. The set
E consists of pairs vertices, i.e., E ⊆ {(uv) | uv ∈ V and u 	= v}. If (uv) ∈ E, we say
that (uv) is an edge in G.9 A path in G is a sequence {vk}sk=1 ⊆ V where s ≥ 2 and
(vk vk+1) ∈ E, k = 1     s − 1. The graph G is connected if there exists a path between
every pair of vertices, i.e., for all uv ∈ V with u 	= v, there exists a path {vk}sk=1 such that
u = v1 and v = vs. The connected graph G is a tree if the path between every pair of
vertices is unique. Let G be a tree and let uv ∈ V be a pair of vertices. We denote the
unique path between them by 〈uv〉.10
In what follows, we shall consider graphs G of the kind G= 〈AE〉, i.e., whose vertex
set is the set of alternatives.
Definition 2. Let G = 〈AE〉 be a tree. The order Pi is single-peaked on G if for all
ajak ∈A, [
aj ∈ 〈r1(Pi)ak〉 \ {ak}
]⇒ [aj Pi ak].
Pick a preference Pi and an arbitrary alternative ak. Since the graph is a tree, there is
a unique path between r1(Pi) and ak. The order Pi is single-peaked if every alternative
aj on this path that is distinct from ak is strictly preferred to ak according to Pi.
A domain D is single-peaked if there exists a tree G such that Pi ∈ D implies Pi is
single-peaked on G.
A case of special interest is the one where the graph G = 〈AE〉 is a line. For-
mally, G is a line if there exists a permutation σ : {1    m} → {1    m} such that
E = {(aσ(k) aσ(k+1))}m−1k=1 . The standard definition of a single-peaked domain is one
where the underlying graph is a line. We illustrate these notions with some examples
below.
Example 1. Let A= {a1 a2 a3 a4}. The domain D¯ is described in Table 1.
The domain D¯ is single-peaked on the tree GT shown in Figure 1.
Note that there are orders that are single-peaked on GT but not included in D¯, for
instance, a2 P10 a1 P10 a3 P10 a4. The largest single-peaked domain on GT contains 12
orders. ♦
9In an undirected graph, (u v) and (vu) represent a same edge.
10In particular, if u= v, 〈uv〉 = {u} is a singleton set.
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Figure 1. Tree GT .
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
a1 a2 a2 a2 a3 a3 a3 a4
a2 a1 a3 a3 a2 a2 a4 a3
a3 a3 a4 a1 a1 a4 a2 a2
a4 a4 a1 a4 a4 a1 a1 a1
Table 2. Domain Dˆ.
Figure 2. Line GL.
Example 2. Let A= {a1 a2 a3 a4}. The domain Dˆ is described in Table 2.
The domain Dˆ is single-peaked on the line GL shown in Figure 2.
In contrast to domain D¯ in Example 1, domain Dˆ includes all orders that are single-
peaked on GL. Observe also that D¯ is not single-peaked on a line; neither is Dˆ single-
peaked on GT . To verify the former claim, observe that any domain that is single-peaked
on a line must have at least two alternatives that have unique orders where these alter-
natives are peaks (these are the alternatives at either end of the line); there are no alter-
natives with this property in D¯. Alternatively, the maximal number of alternatives that
can be second-ranked to a given alternative on any domain that is single-peaked on a
line is two, whereas on domain D¯, the alternative a2 has three distinct second-ranked
alternatives a1, a3, and a4. ♦
3. Main result: Single-peakedness
Our main result characterizes single-peaked domains.
Theorem. Every path-connected domain that admits a unanimous, tops-only, and
strategy-proof RSCF satisfying the compromise property is single-peaked. Conversely, ev-
ery single-peaked domain admits an ex post efficient, tops-only, and strategy-proof RSCF
satisfying the compromise property.
Proof. We first prove necessity. Assume that D is path-connected. In addition, there
exists a RSCF ϕ : DN → (A) that is tops-only, strategy-proof, and unanimous, and sat-
isfies the compromise property. We will show that there exists a tree G such that D is
single-peaked on G.
The first four lemmas establish critical properties of the RSCF ϕ.
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Lemma 1. Let ajak ∈ A with (aj ak) ∈ FPT(D). Let PiP ′i ∈ D be such that (i) r1(Pi) =
r2(P
′
i) = aj , (ii) r2(Pi) = r1(P ′i) = ak, and (iii) rt(Pi) = rt(P ′i), t = 3    m. Then, for
all P−i ∈ DN−1, ϕj(PiP−i) + ϕk(PiP−i) = ϕj(P ′i P−i) + ϕk(P ′i P−i) and ϕt(PiP−i) =
ϕt(P
′
i P−i) for all at ∈A \ {ajak}.
Suppose voter i switches her order from Pi to P ′i , a move that involves the reshuffling
of the top two alternatives, say aj and ak, while leaving all other alternatives unaffected.
According to Lemma 1, the switch leaves the probabilities of alternatives other than aj
and ak, and the sum of probabilities of aj and ak, unchanged. Lemma 1 is a special case
of Lemma 2 in Gibbard (1977). It is a consequence of strategy-proofness and we omit its
elementary proof.
Lemma 2. If domain D admits a unanimous, tops-only, and strategy-proof RSCF satis-
fying the compromise property, then it admits a two-voter unanimous, tops-only, and
strategy-proof RSCF satisfying the compromise property.
Proof. Let ϕ : DN → (A) denote an unanimous, tops-only, and strategy-proof RSCF
satisfying the compromise property. We know that there exists Iˆ ⊆ I with |Iˆ| =N/2 if N
is even and |Iˆ| = (N + 1)/2 if N is odd such that, for all PiPj ∈ D with (i) r1(Pi) 	= r1(Pj)
and (ii) ar ≡ r2(Pi)= r2(Pj), we have ϕr(Pi    Pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Iˆ
 Pj    Pj︸ ︷︷ ︸
I\Iˆ
) > 0.
Construct a two-voter RSCF φ : D2 → (A) as φ(P1P2) = ϕ(P1    P1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Iˆ
 P2    P2︸ ︷︷ ︸
I\Iˆ
)
for all P1P2 ∈ D. In other words, φ is constructed by “merging” all voters in Iˆ and all
voters in I \ Iˆ in ϕ.11 Clearly, φ is a RSCF satisfying unanimity and the tops-only property.
It is also strategy-proof (see the proof of Lemma 3 in Sen 2011). We show that φ satisfies
the compromise property.
Let I¯ = {1} in the two-voter model. Let P1P2 ∈D with (i) r1(P1) 	= r1(P2) and (ii) ar ≡
r2(P1) = r2(P2). Then φr(P1P2) = ϕr(P1    P1︸ ︷︷ ︸
Iˆ
 P2    P2︸ ︷︷ ︸
I\Iˆ
) > 0, where the equality fol-
lows from the construction of φ and the inequality follows from the fact that ϕ satisfies
the compromise property. Therefore φ satisfies the compromise property. This com-
pletes the proof of the lemma. 
In view of Lemma 2, we can assume without loss of generality that the set of voters
is {12} and ϕ is a RSCF ϕ :D2 → (A) that is unanimous, tops-only, and strategy-proof,
and satisfies the compromise property. We make a further simplification in notation.
Since ϕ is tops-only, we can represent a profile P ∈ D2 by a pair of alternatives aj and
ak, where r1(P1) = aj and r1(P2) = ak. We shall also occasionally let (ajP2) denote a
preference profile (P1P2), where r1(P1)= aj .
11Any choice of the cardinality of Iˆ works for our proof, provided 0 < |Iˆ| <N . We could have assumed,
for instance, that |Iˆ| = 2 or |Iˆ| =N − 1.
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Lemma 3. Let ajak ∈ A with (aj ak) ∈ FPT(D). There exists β ∈ [01] such that
ϕ(ajak)= βej + (1−β)ek.
Proof. Let P1P ′1 ∈ D be such that (i) r1(P1) = r2(P ′1) = aj , (ii) r2(P1) = r1(P ′1) = ak, and
(iii) rt(P1)= rt(P ′1), t = 3    m (such two preferences exist since (aj ak) ∈ FPT(D)). We
then have
ϕj(aj ak)+ϕk(ajak) = ϕj(P1 ak)+ϕk(P1 ak) (by the tops-only property)
= ϕj(P ′1 ak)+ϕk(P ′1 ak) (by Lemma 1)
= ϕk(akak)= 1 (by unanimity)
Let ϕj(aj ak)= β. Thus, ϕ(ajak)= βej + (1−β)ek as required. 
The next lemma considers situations that are more general than those considered in
the previous one. We illustrate it with an example. Suppose (a1 a2) (a2 a3) ∈ FPT(D).
We know from Lemma 3 that there exist β1β2 ∈ [01] such that ϕ(a1 a2) = β1e1 +
(1 − β1)e2 and ϕ(a2 a3) = β2e2 + (1 − β2)e3. The next lemma shows that β2 > β1 and
ϕ(a1 a3)= β1e1 + (β2 −β1)e2 + (1−β2)e3.
Lemma 4. Let {ak}sk=1 ⊆ A, s ≥ 3, be such that (akak+1) ∈ FPT(D), k = 1     s − 1. Let
βk = ϕk(akak+1), k= 1     s− 1. Then the following two conditions hold.
(i) We have 0≤ βk < βk+1 ≤ 1, k= 1     s− 2.
(ii) For all 1≤ i < j ≤ s, ϕ(aiaj)= βiei +∑j−1k=i+1(βk −βk−1)ek + (1−βj−1)ej .
Proof. We know from Lemma 3 that ϕ(akak+1) = βkek + (1 − βk)ek+1, k = 1    
s − 1. Pick k with 1 ≤ k ≤ s − 2. Since (ak+1 ak+2) ∈ FPT(D) and ak /∈ {ak+1 ak+2},
Lemma 1 implies ϕk+1(akak+2) + ϕk+2(akak+2) = ϕk+1(akak+1) + ϕk+2(akak+1) =
ϕk+1(akak+1) = 1 − βk and ϕk(akak+2) = ϕk(akak+1) = βk. Also, since (akak+1) ∈
FPT(D), Lemma 1 implies ϕk(akak+2)+ ϕk+1(akak+2)= ϕk(ak+1 ak+2)+ ϕk+1(ak+1
ak+2) = ϕk+1(ak+1 ak+2) = βk+1. Therefore, ϕk+1(akak+2) = βk+1 − ϕk(akak+2) =
βk+1 − βk and ϕk+2(akak+2) = 1 − βk − ϕk+1(akak+2) = 1 − βk+1. Therefore,
ϕk(akak+2) + ϕk+1(akak+2) + ϕk+2(akak+2) = 1 and ϕ(akak+2) = βkek +
(βk+1 − βk)ek+1 + (1 − βk+1)ek+2. Therefore βk+1 ≥ βk. We conclude the argument
by showing that the inequality must be strict.
Since (akak+1) (ak+1 ak+2) ∈ FPT(D), we have P∗1 P∗2 ∈ D such that r1(P∗1 ) = ak,
r1(P
∗
2 ) = ak+2, and r2(P∗1 ) = r2(P∗2 ) = ak+1. Thus, C(P∗1 P∗2 ) = {ak+1}. Then the tops-
only property and the compromise property imply that βk+1 − βk = ϕk+1(akak+2) =
ϕk+1(P∗1 P
∗
2 ) > 0 as required. This completes the verification of part (i) of the lemma.
Pick aiaj in the sequence {ak}sk=1 such that i < j. We will prove part (ii) by induction
on the value of l = j− i. Observe that part (ii) has already been proved for the cases l = 1
(Lemma 3) and l = 2 (in the proof of part (i)). Assume therefore that 3 ≤ l ≤ s − 1. We
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impose the following induction hypothesis: for all 1≤ i < j ≤ s,





(βk −βk−1)exk + (1−βj−1)exj
]

We complete the proof by showing that part (ii) holds for all i j with 1≤ i < j ≤ s and
j − i= l.
Since j − i = l ≥ 3, we know that i < i + 1 < j − 1 < j. Also (j − 1) − i = l − 1 < l
and j − (i+ 1)= l − 1< l. The induction hypothesis can then be applied to the profiles
(ai aj−1) and (ai+1 aj). Hence
ϕ(aiaj−1) = βiei +
j−2∑
k=i+1
(βk −βk−1)ek + (1−βj−2)ej−1 and
ϕ(ai+1 aj) = βi+1ei+1 +
j−1∑
k=i+2
(βk −βk−1)ek + (1−βj−1)ej
Since (aj aj−1) ∈ FPT(D) and ai     aj−2 are distinct from aj−1 and aj , Lemma 1 im-
plies ϕi(ai aj) = ϕi(ai aj−1) = βi and ϕk(ai aj) = ϕk(ai aj−1) = βk − βk−1,
k = i + 1     j − 2. Similarly, since (ai ai+1) ∈ FPT(D), aj−1 and aj are distinct
from ai and ai+1, Lemma 1 implies ϕj−1(ai aj) = ϕj−1(ai+1 aj) = βj−1 − βj−2 and
ϕj(ai aj) = ϕj(ai+1 aj) = 1 − βj−1. Thus, ∑jk=i ϕk(ai aj) = 1 and ϕ(aiaj) = βiei +∑j−1
k=i+1(βk − βk−1)ek + (1− βj−1)ej as required. This completes the verification of the
induction hypothesis and hence part (ii) of the lemma. 
To demonstrate that D is single-peaked, we need to construct a tree G= 〈AE〉 and
show that Pi ∈D implies Pi is single-peaked on G.
LetG(D)= 〈AFPT(D)〉 be a graph, i.e., let ajak ∈A constitute an edge inG(D) only
if they satisfy the FPT property. Since D is path-connected, graph G(D) is connected.
The following lemma shows that G(D) is a tree.
Lemma 5. The graphG(D) is a tree.
Proof. Suppose not, i.e., suppose there exists a sequence {ak}sk=1 ⊆ A, s ≥ 3, such
that (akak+1) ∈ FPT(D), k = 1     s, where as+1 = a1. Let βk = ϕk(akak+1), k =
1     s − 1. Since (akak+1) ∈ FPT(D), k = 1     s − 1, Lemma 4 implies ϕ(a1 as) =
β1e1 + ∑s−1k=2(βk − βk−1)ek + (1 − βs−1)es, where 0 ≤ βk < βk+1 ≤ 1, k = 1     s − 2.
However, since (a1 as) ∈ FPT(D), Lemma 3 implies ϕk(a1 as)= 0 for all ak 	= a1 as . We
have a contradiction. 
Lemma 6. The inclusion [Pi ∈D] ⇒ [Pi is single-peaked onG(D)].
Proof. Suppose ataj ak ∈ A are such that r1(Pi) = at and aj ∈ 〈atak〉 \ {ak}. Let
〈atak〉 = {xr}Tr=1, where x1 = at , xT = ak, and aj = xl for some 1 ≤ l < T . If aj = at ,
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aj Pi ak follows trivially. Assume therefore that aj 	= at . Thus, T ≥ 3. Suppose ak Pi aj .
Consider the profile P = (at ak) and ϕ(P). According to Lemma 4, all alternatives in the
sequence {xr}T−1r=2 get strictly positive probability. Hence ϕj(at ak) > 0. Since ϕ satisfies
unanimity, ϕ(akak)= 1. Then voter i can obtain a strictly higher probability on the set
of alternatives at least as preferred to aj under Pi (this set includes ak by hypothesis) by
putting ak on top of her order. This contradicts the strategy-proofness of ϕ. Therefore,
aj Pi ak as required. 
This completes the verification of the necessity part of the theorem.
To demonstrate sufficiency, let D be a single-peaked domain on a tree G = 〈AE〉.
We construct a RSCF ϕ : DN → (A) that is strategy-proof, tops-only, and ex post effi-
cient, and satisfies the compromise property. We proceed as follows: in the first step, we
use the idea in Chatterji et al. (2013) to construct a specific DSCF (see the proof of the
sufficiency part of the theorem in Chatterji et al. 2013); in the second step, we consider
randomization over such DSCFs.
For any set B ⊆A, let G(B) be the minimal subgraph of G that contains B as vertices.
More formally, G(B) is the unique graph that satisfies the following properties.
1. The set of vertices in G(B) contains B.
2. Let ajak ∈ B. Graph G(B) has an edge (aj ak) only if (aj ak) is an edge in G.
3. The graph G(B) is connected.
4. We have ak ∈G(B) if and only if ak ∈ 〈araj〉, where araj ∈ B.
Fix a profile P ∈ DN and an alternative ak ∈ A. Consider the graph G(r1(P)). Sup-
pose ak /∈G(r1(P)). Since G is a tree and contains no cycles, there exists a unique alter-
native in G(r1(P)) that belongs to every path from ak to any vertex in G(r1(P)). Let this
alternative be denoted by aβ(akP).
12 Then define the alternative aπ(akP) as
aπ(akP) =
{
ak if ak ∈G(r1(P))
aβ(akP) if ak /∈G(r1(P))
Consider Example 1. Suppose I = {123}. Let ak be the alternative a4 and let P be a
profile such that r1(P)= {a1 a2 a3}. ThenG(r1(P)) is the graph consisting of the vertices
{a1 a2 a3} and the edges (a1 a2) and (a2 a3). Then aπ(akP) = aβ(a4P) = a2. Further
examples can be found in Chatterji et al. (2013).
For every ak ∈ A, the RSCF φak : DN → (A) is defined as follows: for all P ∈ DN ,
φak(P) = eπ(akP). Evidently, φak is a DSCF. Its outcome at profile P is the “projection”
of ak on the minimal subgraph of G generated by the set of the first-ranked alternatives
in P .
In the next step, we construct the RSCF ϕ : DN → (A) as follows: for all P ∈ DN ,
ϕ(P) =∑ak∈A λakφak(P), where λak > 0 for all ak ∈ A and ∑ak∈A λak = 1. The RSCF is
12It would have been more appropriate to write aβ(akG(r1(P))) but we choose to suppress the dependence
of this alternative on G for notational convenience.
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obtained by choosing over the DSCFs φak , k = 1    m, according to a fixed probabil-
ity distribution where the probability of choosing each such DSCF is strictly positive.
We call RSCF ϕ a weighted projection rule. We claim that ϕ satisfies all the required
properties.13
Lemma 7. The RSCF ϕ is tops-only and strategy-proof.
Proof. According to Proposition 1 in Chatterji et al. (2013), a single-peaked domain is
semi-single-peaked where every alternative can be taken to be a threshold in the defi-
nition of semi-single-peakedness. The sufficiency part of the theorem in Chatterji et al.
(2013) shows that for any threshold ak ∈A, φak is strategy-proof and tops-only, and sat-
isfies unanimity over a semi-single-peaked domain. Consequently, each φak is tops-
only and strategy-proof. Therefore, ϕ, which is a convex combination of distinct tops-
only and strategy-proof RSCFs, is also a tops-only and strategy-proof RSCF.14 
Lemma 8. The RSCF ϕ is ex post efficient.
Proof. Suppose the lemma is false, i.e., there exist P ∈ DN and ajak ∈ A such that
aj Pi ak for all i ∈ I and ϕk(P) > 0. Evidently, ak /∈ r1(P). Since ϕ satisfies unanimity,
ϕk(P) > 0 implies that |r1(P)|> 1. Observe that aπ(at P) ∈G(r1(P)) for all at ∈A. Hence,
by construction of ϕ, if ar is not included in the vertex set of G(r1(P)), then ϕr(P) = 0.
Therefore, ak belongs to the vertex set of G(r1(P)).
Let Ext(G(r1(P))) denote the set of vertices in G(r1(P)) with degree 1, i.e., at ∈
Ext(G(r1(P))) if there exists a unique as ∈ A such that (at as) is an edge in G(r1(P)).
Observe that Ext(G(r1(P))) ⊆ r1(P). (Suppose at ∈ Ext(G(r1(P))) but at /∈ r1(P). Then
at can be deleted as a vertex in G(r1(P)) contradicting the assumption that G(r1(P)) is
minimal.) In other words, the vertices at the ends of every maximal path in G(r1(P))
must be some elements of r1(P).
It follows from the arguments in the two previous paragraphs that ak ∈
G(r1(P)) \ Ext(G(r1(P))). Consequently, there exist i i′ ∈ I such that r1(Pi) 	= r1(Pi′),
ak ∈ 〈r1(Pi) r1(Pi′)〉, and ak 	= r1(Pi) r1(Pi′). Let at be the projection of aj on the inter-
val 〈r1(Pi) r1(Pi′)〉. By assumption, at ∈ 〈r1(Pi) r1(Pi′)〉. Hence, either ak ∈ 〈r1(Pi)at〉
or ak ∈ 〈r1(Pi′)at〉 must hold. Therefore either ak ∈ 〈r1(Pi)aj〉 or ak ∈ 〈r1(Pi′)aj〉 must
hold, i.e., either ak Pi aj or ak Pi′ aj must hold by single-peakedness of D. We have a
contradiction to our initial hypothesis that aj Pi ak for all i ∈ I. Therefore, ϕ is ex post
efficient. 
Lemma 9. The RSCF ϕ satisfies the compromise property.
Proof. Let PiPj ∈ D be such that ak = r1(Pi) 	= r1(Pj) = al and C(PiPj) = {ar}. Let
Iˆ ⊂ I be such that |Iˆ| = N/2 if N is even and |Iˆ| = (N + 1)/2 if N is odd. Let P¯ ∈ DN be
the profile (Pi    Pi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Iˆ
 Pj    Pj︸ ︷︷ ︸
I\Iˆ
). We will show that ϕr(P¯) > 0.
13Some further properties of weighted projection rules are discussed in Appendix A.
14These arguments are routine and therefore omitted.
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
a1 a2 a2 a3 a3 a4
a2 a1 a3 a2 a4 a3
a4 a4 a4 a4 a2 a2
a3 a3 a1 a1 a1 a1
Table 3. Domain D3.
Since D is single-peaked on the tree G = 〈AE〉, it follows that (akar) (al ar) ∈ E.
Hence ar ∈G(r1(P¯)) and φar (P¯)= er . Therefore, ϕr(P¯)≥ λar > 0. 
This completes the proof of the sufficiency part of the theorem. 
3.1 Discussion: Indispensability of the axioms and the richness condition
In this section, we show that our axioms and richness assumption are indispensable for
the theorem. In Examples 3, 4, 5, and 6, we drop, respectively, the compromise, tops-
onlyness, unanimity, and strategy-proofness axioms in turn, and demonstrate the ex-
istence of a non-single-peaked domain that admits RSCFs satisfying the remaining ax-
ioms. In Example 7, we show that the separable domain violates path-connectedness
but admits a unanimous, tops-only, strategy-proof RSCF satisfying the compromise
property.
Example 3 (Dropping the compromise property). Let A = {a1 a2 a3 a4}. The domain
D
3 is described in Table 3.
Since (a1 a2) (a2 a3) (a3 a4) ∈ FPT(D3), domain D3 is path-connected. In view of
the path-connectivity structure, the only candidate for a graph with respect to which D3
could be single-peaked is the line GL in Figure 2. However, preferences P1 and P2 violate
single-peakedness in this case. Hence D3 is not single-peaked.
The domain D3 is, however, semi-single-peaked (Chatterji et al. 2013) with respect to
(GLa2). Consequently, the projection rule φa2 : [D3]2 → (A) is unanimous, tops-only,
and strategy-proof. (This can also be verified directly.)
Note that C(PiPj) = ∅ for all profile pairs with distinct peaks except for the pairs
(P1P4) and (P3P6). Accordingly, C(P1P4) = {a2}, C(P3P6) = {a3}, and ϕ2(P1P4) =
ϕ2(P4P1) = 1 > 0, but ϕ3(P3P6) = ϕ3(P6P3) = 0. Therefore, RSCF φa2 violates the
compromise property. ♦
Example 4 (Dropping the tops-only property). Let A = {a1 a2 a3 a4}. The domain D4
is described in Table 4.
Once again, domain D4 is path-connected since (a1 a2) (a2 a3) (a3 a4) ∈ FPT(D4).
Using the same arguments as in Example 3, it follows that D is not single-peaked.
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
a1 a2 a2 a3 a3 a4
a2 a1 a3 a2 a4 a3
a4 a4 a4 a4 a1 a1
a3 a3 a1 a1 a2 a2
Table 4. Domain D4.
Let φak : [D4]2 → (A), k= 1234, denote the four projection rules on the line GL






if (PiPj) ∈ {P1P2} × {P5P6} or {P5P6} × {P1P2}
1
3φ
a1(PiPj)+ 16φa2(PiPj)+ 16φa3(PiPj)+ 13φa4(PiPj)
otherwise.
The RSCF ϕ is an equal weight random dictatorship when a preference profile be-
longs to the subdomain {{P1P2} × {P5P6}} ∪ {{P5P6} × {P1P2}}; otherwise it is a spe-
cific weighted projection rule on the line GL. The RSCF ϕ is also strategy-proof; this
can be verified by showing that in every possible manipulation, probabilities are trans-
ferred from preferred alternatives to less preferred alternatives in the true preference
while probabilities assigned to other alternatives are unchanged. The details of the ver-
ification are found in Appendix B.
Note that r1(P4) = r1(P5) = a3 and ϕ2(P1P4) = 16 	= 0 = ϕ2(P1P5). Therefore ϕ vi-
olates the tops-only property. Note that C(PiPj) = ∅ for all profile pairs with distinct
peaks except for pairs (P1P4) and (P3P6). Accordingly, C(P1P4) = {a2}, C(P3P6) =
{a3}, ϕ2(P4P1) = ϕ2(P1P4) = 16 > 0, and ϕ3(P3P6) = ϕ3(P6P3) = 16 > 0. Hence, the
compromise property is satisfied. ♦
Example 5 (Dropping unanimity). Consider the complete domain P. Fix a collection
[λak]mk=1 ∈Rm++ with
∑m






ek for all P ∈ PN
The RSCF ϕ is tops-only and strategy-proof, and satisfies the compromise property.
Since it is a convex combination of all constant DSCFs, it violates unanimity. ♦
Example 6 (Dropping strategy-proofness). Consider the complete domain P. Fix a col-
lection [λak]mk=1 ∈Rm++ with
∑m
k=1 λak = 1, and construct the RSCF ϕ : PN → (A) as
ϕ(P)=
{
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P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8
a1 a1 a2 a2 a3 a3 a4 a4
a2 a4 a1 a3 a2 a4 a1 a3
a4 a2 a3 a1 a4 a2 a3 a1
a3 a3 a4 a4 a1 a1 a2 a2
Table 5. Domain D7.
The RSCF ϕ picks alternative ak for sure if ak is the peak for all voters in a profile. In
all other profiles, it is a convex combination of all constant DSCFs. It is unanimous and
tops-only, and satisfies the compromise property but not strategy-proofness. ♦
Example 7 (Dropping path-connectedness). Let A = {a1 a2 a3 a4}. The domain D7 is
specified in Table 5.
A convenient way to represent these preferences is to regard each alternative ak, as
comprising two components (a1ka
2
k). Specifically, A
1 = {01}, A2 = {01}, a1 = (00),
a2 = (10), a3 = (11), and a4 = (01). Then domain D7 is a separable domain (Barberà
et al. 1991, Le Breton and Sen 1999). Apparently, FPT(D7) = ∅ and hence domain D7 is
not path-connected.
For all PiPj ∈D7, let r1(Pi)= ai ≡ (a1i  a2i ) and r1(Pj)= aj ≡ (a1j  a2j ). Accordingly, D7
admits the following four DSCFs: for all PiPj ∈D7,
φa1(PiPj) = e(min(a1i a1j )min(a2i a2j )) φ
a2(PiPj)= e(max(a1i a1j )min(a2i a2j ))
φa3(PiPj) = e(max(a1i a1j )max(a2i a2j )) φ
a4(PiPj)= e(min(a1i a1j )max(a2i a2j ))
The DSCFs φa1 , φa2 , φa3 , φa4 are unanimous, anonymous, tops-only, and strategy-
proof.




λakφak(P) for all P ∈ [D7]2
Since it is a convex combination of DSCFs satisfying unanimity, anonymity, tops-
onlyness and strategy-proofness, ϕ also satisfies these properties. Finally, observe that
C(P1P5) = {a2}, C(P2P6) = {a4}, C(P3P7) = {a1}, C(P4P8) = {a3}, and C(PiPj) = ∅
for all other pairs (PiPj) with r1(Pi) 	= r1(Pj). Since ϕ2(P1P5) = ϕ2(P5P1) = λa2 > 0,
ϕ4(P2P6) = ϕ4(P6P2) = λa4 > 0, ϕ1(P3P7) = ϕ1(P7P3) = λa1 > 0, and ϕ3(P4P8) =
ϕ3(P8P4)= λa3 > 0, RSCF ϕ satisfies the compromise property. ♦
4. Conclusion
We have characterized domains of single-peaked preferences as the only domains that
admit well behaved random social choice functions.
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Pi ∈ D¯
r1(Pi)= a1 r1(Pi)= a2 r1(Pi)= a3 r1(Pi)= a4
Pj ∈ D¯ r1(Pj)= a1 e1 13e1 + 23e2 13e1 + 13e2 + 13e3 13e1 + 16e2 + 12e4
r1(Pj)= a2 13e1 + 23e2 e2 23e2 + 13e3 12e2 + 12e4
r1(Pj)= a3 13e1 + 13e2 + 13e3 23e2 + 13e3 e3 16e2 + 13e3 + 12e4
r1(Pj)= a4 13e1 + 16e2 + 12e4 12e2 + 12e4 16e2 + 13e3 + 12e4 e4
Table 6. RSCF ϕ : D¯2 → (A).
Appendix A: The weighted projection rule
In the verification of the sufficiency part of the theorem, we constructed a weighted pro-
jection rule. In this section, we briefly describe some important features of such rules.
A projection rule is a DSCF that is strategy-proof, efficient, tops-only, and anony-
mous. A weighted projection rule is a convex combination of all projection rules and
inherits all the properties of projection rules mentioned above and satisfies the com-
promise property. If the weights are chosen to be 1/|A|, a weighted projection rule also
satisfies neutrality.15
Weighted projection rules are not the only RSCFs that satisfy the required properties
in the theorem on single-peaked domains on a tree. One way to see this is to note that
a projection rule on a line is a particular case of a phantom voter rule (see Moulin 1980,
Border and Jordan 1983, and Schummer and Vohra 2002) where all phantom voters have
the same peak.16 Consider the single-peaked domain on a line (see Example 2) and let
the RSCF ϕ : DN → (A), N ≥ 3, be a convex combination of all phantom voter rules
on the line where every phantom voter rule has strictly positive weight. It is easy to
show that ϕ is ex post efficient, anonymous, tops-only, and strategy-proof, and satisfies
the compromise property. However, RSCF ϕ is not a weighted projection rule since it
includes some phantom voter rules with distinct peaks of phantom voters. In the case
of two voters, efficiency reduces the number of phantom voters to one. However even
in this case, there exist strategy-proof, ex post efficient, tops-only RSCFs satisfying the
compromise property that are not weighted projection rules. This is shown in Example 8
below.
Example 8. Consider domain D¯ in Example 1. Note that for all PiPj ∈ D¯ with r1(Pi) 	=
r1(Pj), either C(PiPj) = {a2} or C(PiPj) = ∅. Domain D¯ admits the RSCF ϕ : D¯2 →
(A) specified in Table 6. It is easy to verify that ϕ is ex post efficient, anonymous, and
tops-only, and satisfies the compromise property.
There are three maximal paths in GT : {a1 a2 a3}, {a1 a2 a4}, and {a3 a2 a4}.
Accordingly, we have three subdomains: D¯1 = {Pi ∈ D¯ | r1(Pi) ∈ {a1 a2 a3}}, D¯2 =
15A RSCF ϕ : DN → (A) is neutral if for every permutation σ : {1    m} → {1    m} and PP ′ ∈ DN
with [ak Pi al] ⇔ [aσ(k) Pi ′ aσ(l)] for all i ∈ I and k l ∈ {1    m}, we have ϕr(P)= ϕσ(r)(P ′).
16Thomson (1993) and Vohra (1999) show that the family of projection rules is uniquely characterized by
Pareto optimality and the axiom of replacement dominance over the single-peaked domain.
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{Pi ∈ D¯ | r1(Pi) ∈ {a1 a2 a4}}, and D¯3 = {Pi ∈ D¯ | r1(Pi) ∈ {a3 a2 a4}}. Observe that for
every P ∈ D¯2, there exists k ∈ {123} (not necessarily unique) such that P ∈ D¯2k.17
The RSCF ϕ is defined by considering a separate weighted projection rule for each
of the subdomains D¯1 D¯2, and D¯3. Specifically, for all P1 ∈ D¯21, P2 ∈ D¯22, and P3 ∈ D¯23,
ϕ(P1) = 13φa1(P1)+ 13φa2(P1)+ 13φa3(P1)
ϕ(P2) = 13φa1(P2)+ 16φa2(P2)+ 12φa4(P2)
ϕ(P3) = 13φa3(P3)+ 16φa2(P3)+ 12φa4(P3)
Note that if P ∈ D¯2k and P ∈ D¯2k′ , where k 	= k′, ϕ(P) is identically induced by the
two corresponding distinct weighted projection rules. For instance, (P1P2) ∈ D¯21 and
(P1P2) ∈ D¯22. According to D¯1, ϕ(P1P2) = 13e1 + 23e2, while according to D¯2, we also
have ϕ(P1P2)= 13e1 + 23e2.
Similar to the verification of strategy-proofness in Example 4, we fix voter i and check
all possible manipulations: (PiPj) ↔ (P ′i Pj). It follows from standard arguments that
manipulation never occurs within any of the subdomains D¯1, D¯2, and D¯3, i.e., if the true
preference and the misrepresentation lie within the same subdomain. We will consider
every misrepresentation that leads to an outcome according to a different weighted pro-
jection rule relative to truth-telling. It covers three situations and we specify the changes
of probabilities in each situation that indicate that probabilities are always transferred
from the preferred alternatives to less preferred alternatives according to the true pref-
erence.
1. We have (Pi a3)↔ (P ′i a3), where r1(Pi)= a1 and r1(P ′i)= a4:
• Probabilities 13 and 16 are transferred from a1 and a2 to a4, respectively, where
a1 Pi a4 and a2 Pi a4 by single-peakedness.
• Probabilities 13 and 16 are transferred from a4 to a1 and a2, respectively, where
a4 P
′
i a1 and a4 P
′
i a2.
2. We have (Pi a4)↔ (P ′i a4), where r1(Pi)= a1 and r1(P ′i)= a3:
• Probability 13 is transferred from a1 to a3, where a1 Pi a3.
• Probability 13 is transferred from a3 to a1, where a3 P ′i a1.
3. We have (Pi a1)↔ (P ′i a1), where r1(Pi)= a3 and r1(P ′i)= a4:
• Probabilities 13 and 16 are transferred from a3 and a2 to a4, respectively, where
a3 Pi a4 and a2 Pi a4 by single-peakedness.
• Probabilities 13 and 16 are transferred from a4 to a3 and a2, respectively, where
a4 P
′
i a3 and a4 P
′
i a2.
In conclusion, RSCF ϕ is strategy-proof.
17For instance, (P1P2) ∈ D¯21 and (P1P2) ∈ D¯22.
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Last, we verify that ϕ is not a weighted projection rule. Suppose it is not true. Then
there exists λak ≥ 0, k = 1234, with ∑4k=1 λak = 1 such that ϕ(P) =∑4k=1 λakφak(P)
for all P ∈ D¯2. We must then have (i) λa1 = ϕ1(a1 a2) = 13 , (ii) λa3 = ϕ3(a3 a2) = 13 , and
(iii) λa4 = ϕ4(a4 a2) = 12 . Consequently, λa1 + λa3 + λa4 > 1 which is a contradiction.
Hence, ϕ is not a weighted projection rule. ♦
Appendix B: Strategy-proofness in Example 4
To verify that RSCF ϕ in Example 4 is strategy-proof, it suffices to show that in every
possible manipulation, probabilities are transferred from preferred alternatives to less
preferred alternatives in the true preference while probabilities assigned to other alter-
natives are unchanged. Note that since RSCF ϕ is anonymous, we can fix a voter, say
voter i, and consider all possible manipulations, (PiPj)↔ (P ′i Pj).
According to the construction of ϕ, it is evident that manipulation can never occur
if both truth-telling and misrepresentation result in a random dictatorship outcome.
Next, voter i would consider a misrepresentation that makes RSCF ϕ change from
random dictatorship to the weighted projection rule or vice versa. Given Pi ∈ {P1P2},
Pj ∈ {P5P6}, and P ′i ∈ {P3P4P5P6}, we specify the changes of probabilities in all pos-
sible manipulations that indicate that probabilities are always transferred from the pre-
ferred alternatives to less preferred alternatives in the true preference.
1. We have (P1P5)↔ (P3P5):
• Probability 12 is transferred from a1 to a2, where a1 P1 a2.
• Probability 12 is transferred from a2 to a1, where a2 P3 a1.
2. We have (P1P5)↔ (P4P5) or (P5P5):
• Probability 12 is transferred from a1 to a3, where a1 P1 a3.
• Probability 12 is transferred from a3 to a1, where a3 P4 a1 and a3 P5 a1.
3. We have (P1P5)↔ (P6P5):
• Probabilities 16 and 13 are transferred from a1 to a3 and a4, respectively, where
a1 P1 a3 and a1 P1 a4.
• Probabilities 16 and 13 are transferred from a3 and a4 to a1, respectively where
a3 P6 a1 and a4 P6 a1.
4. We have (P2P5)↔ (P3P5): Probability does not change.
5. We have (P2P5)↔ (P4P5) or (P5P5):
• Probability 12 is transferred from a2 to a3, where a2 P2 a3.
• Probability 12 is transferred from a3 to a2, where a3 P4 a2 and a3 P5 a2.
6. We have (P2P5)↔ (P6P5):
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• Probabilities 16 and 13 are transferred from a2 to a3 and a4, respectively, where
a2 P2 a3 and a2 P2 a4.
• Probabilities 16 and 13 are transferred from a3 and a4 to a2, respectively, where
a3 P6 a2 and a4 P6 a2.
7. We have (P1P6)↔ (P3P6):
• Probabilities 12 and 16 are transferred from a1 to a2 and from a4 to a3, respec-
tively, where a1 P1 a2 and a4 P1 a3.
• Probabilities 12 and 16 are transferred from a2 to a1 and from a3 to a4, respec-
tively, where a2 P3 a1 and a3 P3 a4.
8. We have (P1P6)↔ (P4P6) or (P5P6):
• Probabilities 12 and 16 are transferred from a1 and a4 to a3, respectively, where
a1 P1 a3 and a4 P1 a3.
• Probabilities 12 and 16 are transferred from a3 to a1 and a4, respectively, where
a3 P4 a1, a3 P4 a4 and a3 P5 a1, a3 P5 a4.
9. We have (P1P6)↔ (P6P6):
• Probability 12 is transferred from a1 to a4, where a1 P1 a4.
• Probability 12 is transferred from a4 to a1, where a4 P6 a1.
10. We have (P2P6)↔ (P3P6):
• Probability 16 is transferred from a4 to a3, where a4 P2 a3.
• Probability 16 is transferred from a3 to a4, where a3 P3 a4.
11. We have (P2P6)↔ (P4P6) or (P5P6):
• Probabilities 12 and 16 are transferred from a2 and a4 to a3, respectively, where
a2 P2 a3 and a4 P2 a3.
• Probabilities 12 and 16 are transferred from a3 to a2 and a4, respectively, where
a3 P4 a2, a3 P4 a4 and a3 P5 a2, a3 P5 a4.
12. We have (P2P6)↔ (P6P6):
• Probability 12 is transferred from a2 to a4, where a2 P2 a4.
• Probability 12 is transferred from a4 to a2, where a4 P6 a2.
By a symmetric argument, we know that voter i would neither manipulate at
(PiPj) ∈ {P5P6} × {P1P2} via P ′i ∈ {P1P2P3P4} nor manipulate at (PiPj) ∈ {P1P2
P3P4} × {P1P2} via P ′i ∈ {P5P6}.
Last, we show that no manipulation occurs within the weighted projection rule. Ac-
cordingly, we consider all possible manipulations (PiPj) ↔ (P ′i Pj) in three jointly ex-
haustive cases:
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(i) PiPjP ′i ∈ {P1P2P3P4}
(ii) PiPjP ′i ∈ {P3P4P5P6}
(iii) Pi ∈ {P1P2}, Pj ∈ {P3P4} and P ′i ∈ {P5P6}.
Note that in case (i), ϕ4(PiPj) = 0 and ϕ4(P ′i Pj) = 0. Since preferences P1, P2, P3,
P4 are single-peaked on the subline {a1 a2 a3}, possible manipulations via any of the
preferences P1, P2, P3, P4 are not beneficial. Case (ii) is symmetric to case (i).18 In case
(iii), note that ϕ(P2Pj) = ϕ(P3Pj) and ϕ(P5Pj) = ϕ(P4Pj). Then, in case (iii), a ma-
nipulation of voter i via P2 or P5 is identical to a manipulation via P3 or P4, respectively,
and hence is nonprofitable according to cases (i) and (ii), respectively. Now, we specify
the changes of probabilities in the rest of the possible manipulations in case (iii) that
also indicate that probabilities are always transferred from the preferred alternatives to
less preferred alternatives in the true preference.
1. We have (P1Pj)↔ (P6Pj):
• Probabilities 13 and 16 are transferred from a1 to a4 and from a2 to a3, respec-
tively, where a1 P1 a4 and a2 P1 a3.
• Probabilities 13 and 16 are transferred from a4 to a1 and from a3 to a2, respec-
tively, where a4 P6 a1 and a3 P6 a2.
2. We have (P2Pj)→ (P6Pj): Probabilities 16 and 13 are transferred from a2 to a3 and
a4, respectively, where a2 P2 a3 and a2 P2 a4.
3. We have (P5Pj)→ (P1Pj): Probabilities 13 and 16 are transferred from a3 to a1 and
a2, respectively, where a3 P5 a1 and a3 P5 a2.
In conclusion, RSCF ϕ is strategy-proof.
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